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of Directors v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 520 A.2d 1347 (1987).
ENTITLED TO TRADEMARK

Modern trademark principles emerged in response to improper conduct by competitors of commercial enterprises.' As
such, trademark law has developed primarily in the commercial
arena. 2 Courts have recognized, however, that religious or eleemosynary organizations are entitled to the same privileges and
protections as commercial enterprises with respect to trademark
rights." The underlying rationale is that, like a commercial entity, a religious organization may need to protect its good will,
reputation, and membership contributions as a matter of economic survival. 4 Trademark infringement actions involving religious or eleemosynary organizations typically arise when a
branch church seeks to use the same or similar name as the parI 1J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.4 at 54-55 (2d
ed. 1984). Generally, trademarks serve four purposes which entitle them to protection. Specifically, a trademark identifies a seller, signifies a source, establishes the
quality of an item, and facilitates advertising. Id. § 3.1(A) at 104.
2 See I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.4 at 54-55.
" See, e.g., Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944); National Bd.
of YMCA v. YMCA of Charleston, S.C., 335 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D.S.C. 1971);
Oklahoma Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of the State of Okla., Inc. v. New
Hope Assembly of God of Norman, Okla., Inc., 597 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Okla. 1979);
Polish Nat'l Catholic Church of the Holy Mother of the Rosary v. Diocese of Buffalo, 171 N.Y.S. 401, 402-03 (Supp. Ct. 1918). See generallV Annotation, Right of
Chauitableor Religious Association or Corporation to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar
Name by Another, 37 A.L.R. 3d 277 (1971 & Supp. 1987); 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.14[2] (1984 & Supp. 1986); E. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPE-

TrION AND TRADEMARKS, § 86 at 256 (4th ed. 1947).
4 See, e.g., Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944); National Bd.
of YMCA v. YMCA of Charleston. S.C., 335 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D.S.C. 1971);
Oklahoma Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of the State of Okla., Inc. v. New
Hope Assembly of God of Norman, Okla., Inc., 597 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Okla. 1979).
See also I J. GILSON, supra note 3, at § 2.14[2] (quoting Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d
979, 985 (4th Cir. 1944)); E. NIMs, supra note 3, § 86 at 256. As Professor Nims
explained,
[t]he fact that a corporation is an eleemosynary or charitable one and
has no goods to sell, and does not make money, does not take it out of
the protection of the law of unfair competition. Distinct identity is just
as important to such a company, oftentimes, as it is to a commercial
company. Its financial credit-its ability to raise funds, its general reputation, the credit of those managing it and supporting it, are all at stake
if its name is filched away by some other organization, and the two become confused in the minds of the public.
Id.
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ent church after disaffiliation. 5 Recently, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Christian Science Board of Directors v. Evans,"
ruled that a parent church had no exclusive right to use the
phrase "Christian Science Church" because it the term was generic, and therefore any organization practicing the Christian
Science religion was entitled to the phrase.7
Mary Baker Eddy established the Christian Science religion
in 1866.' As the number of followers increased, an organization
known as The Church of Christ, Scientist was formed in 1879.'
Subsequently, the First Church of Christ Scientist (Mother
Church) was established in 1889.'0 In 1892, the Mother Church
relocated to Boston, Massachusetts, where all business was conducted by a board of directors." The Church of Christ, Scientist
eventually developed into a world wide religion with the Mother
Church at the center of the organization. 2 Local branch
churches or societies were established and named pursuant to

the directives set forth in the Church Manual.'"
5 See, e.g., National Bd. of YMCA v. YMCA of Charleston, S.C., 335 F. Supp.
615, 621 (D.S.C. 1971); Jandron v. Zuendel, 139 F. Supp. 887, 888 (N.D. Ohio
1955); Oklahoma Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God of the State of Okla., Inc.
v. New Hope Assembly of God of Norman, Okla., Inc., 597 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Okla.
1979); Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, 324, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976); McDaniel v. Mirza Ahmad Sohrab, 27 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
aff'd, 262 A.D. 838, 29 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1941).
6 105 N.J. 297, 520 A.2d 1347 (1987).
7 See id. at 307, 520 A.2d at 1352.
8 Id. at 300, 520 A.2d at 1349. The chancery court recognized:
Christian Science refers to a religion founded and developed by Eddy in
the late 19th century as a result of her discovery of a mental or spiritual
means of healing ailments and illnesses. Initially, she entered into an
association with several other people who sought to learn the practical
healing techniques associated with her beliefs. Eddy published a book
in 1875 entitled Science and Health With Ke", to the Scriptures which has
evolved into the denominational textbook.
Christian Science Board of Directors v. Evans, 191 NJ. Super. 411, 415, 467 A.2d
268, 270 (Ch. Div. 1983), red, 105 N.J. 297, 520 A.2d 1347 (1987).
1) Christian Science Bd. of Direclors, 105 NJ. at 300, 520 A.2d at 1349.
'

Id.

Id. The publishing department of the Mother Church was managed and operated by the Board of Trustees. Id.
'

12 Id.

13 Id. Typically, a branch church would be designated as "First Church of
Christ, Scientist," followed by the applicable geographical location of the particular
branch. Id. If there was more than one branch in a specific location, then a numerical classification would be added accordingly. Id.
The naming procedure set forth in the Church Manual was codified in N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 16:3-2 (West 1984). Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 NJ. at 300-01,

520 A.2d at 1349. This statute provides in pertinent part "The corporate title,
which shall be 'Church of Christ Scientist', prefixed by 'First', 'Second', 'Third', or
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One such branch was founded in Plainfield, New Jersey (the
Plainfield Church) and received its authorization from the
Mother Church in 1892.' 4 In 1977, a doctrinal dispute arose between the Plainfield Church and the Mother Church. 5 As a result of this dispute, the Mother Church eventually served the
Plainfield Church with a notice of disaffiliation.'
That notice
prohibited the Plainfield Church from publicly referring to itself
as a "Church of Christ, Scientist," or a "Christian Science
Church," or from in any way using the terminology "Christian
Science" or like words to describe their organization. 17 Thereafter, the Plainfield Church disassociated itself from the Mother
Church and renamed its church the "Independent Christian Science Church of Plainfield, New Jersey.""H
The Mother Church then brought suit against the Plainfield
Church in New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, alleging violation of trademark and service mark rights. '' The Mother
other numerical designation, and followed by the name of the place where it shall
be located." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:3-2(a) (West 1984). The distinction between a
society or a branch is generally the size of the organization. Christian Science Bd. of
Directors, 105 N.J. at 300, 520 A.2d at 1349.
14 Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 300, 520 A.2d at 1349. The Plainfield Church was formally affiliated with the Mother Church, and in that same year,
the Mother Church relocated to Boston. Id.
15 Id. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349.
i Id. The dispute arose and on June 16, 1977, the Mother Church withdrew its
recognition of the Plainfield Church. Id. A letter from the Mother Church stated:
"Former First Church, Plainfield, no longer has the legal right to identify itself publicly as a 'Church of Christ, Scientist' or a 'Christian Science Church' or in any way
use the term 'Christian Science' or similar words to describe any of its activities."
1d. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349.
17 Id.
' 1d. The Plainfield Church terminated its corporate status, which it had acquired pursuant to 1924 N.J. Laws, c. 66; 1927 N.J. Laws, c. 242. See Christian Science
Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349. These statutory sections were
specifically enacted for the Church of Christ, Scientist. See 1924 N.J. Laws, c. 66;
1927 N.J. Laws, c. 242. These statutes provide for incorporation, corporate title,
board of trustees, and consolidation of branches. See id. The supreme court noted
that the statutory provisions "refer consistently to '[C]hurch of Christ, Scientist,'
and nowhere use the expression 'Christian Science IChurch].' " Christian Science Bd.
of Directors, 105 N.J. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349. The Plainfield Church then reincorporated as a general religious corporation. Id. (citation omitted).
19 Christian Science Bd.of Directors, 105 N.J. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349. Three years
after disassociation the Mother Church filed suit. See Brief and Appendix on Behalf
of the Defendants Respondence at 1,Christian Science Bd. of Directors v. Evans,
105 N.J. 297, 520 A.2d 1347 (1987) [hereinafter 1)efendants-Respondents' Briefn.
The name defendants were trustees of the Plainfield Church. Christian Science Bd. of
Directors, 105 N.J. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349. The individual defendants were: Doris
W. Evans, Stephen T'. Evans, Roy Debbelarr, JoanneJanuzzi, Ruth Pfeifer and Mary
Beth Singleterry. Id. at 297, 520 A.2d at 1347.
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Church sought to enjoin the Plainfield Church from using the
2 -'
name "Independent Christian Science Church of Plainfield.
The chancery division enjoined the Plainfield Church from using
the phrases "Church of Christ, Scientist," "Christian Science
Church," and "Christian Science" to identify their organization. 2 ' The court ruled, however, that the Plainfield Church
could use the term "Christian Science," "in a fair, truthful, and
non-deceptive manner, both as to form and content, . . . in
phrases or sentences to refer to the religion developed by Mary
Baker Eddy."2
20 Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 301, 520 A.2d at 1349. More specifically, the Mother Church sought to restrain the Plainfield Church
from using as the name of, or in connection with, any church, religious
group, society, association, organization, or service now existing or
which may be organized or exist, independently of the Mother Church
and its branches, the names or designations, "Church of Christ, Scientist," "First Church of Christ, Scientist," "Branch Church of Christ, Scientist," "Christian Science Church," "Independent Christian Science
Church," "Christian Science Reading Room," "Independent Christian
Science Reading Room," or any name so similar thereto as to be likely
to deceive the public or lead to confusion.
Id. at 301-02, 520 A.2d at 1349-50.
The Mother Church also claimed that the Plainfield Church's name so closely
resembled that of the Mother Church's as to manifest deception and confusion. Id.
at 302, 520 A.2d at 1350. As the supreme court summarized:
Plaintiffs alleged that the terms used by defendants so nearly resembled
plaintiffs' names and marks (trademarks and service marks) as to be
likely to cause confusion, mistake, and deception, to constitute false representation, and to result in unfair appropriation of plaintiffs' name,
reputation, and good will. They charged that use of the terms constituted a false designation of origin and a false description or misrepresentation under federal trademark law, section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125.
Id.
Additionally, plaintiffs argued that the Plainfield Church's use of the phrase
infringed upon the Mother Church's registered service and trademarks. Id. The
Mother Church contended that one form of infringement was on the registered
mark of "Christian Science Monitor." Id. Therefore, the Mother Church asserted
that the use of the term "Independent Christian Science Church of Plainfield" violated N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-1 (West Supp. 1987), which provides in relevant part
that "[n]o merchant, firm, or corporation shall appropriate for his or their own use
a name, brand, trade-mark, reputation or goodwill of any maker in whose product
such merchant, firm or corporation deals. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at
302, 520 A.2d at 1350. Finally, the Mother Church urged that defendants' conduct
"constituted 'unfair competition, trademark and service-mark infringement, palming off, dilution and injury to reputation, all in violation of the common law of the
State of New Jersey.' " Id.
21 Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 302-03, 520 A.2d at 1350.
22 Id. at 303, 520 A.2d at 1350. Pending appeal, the Plainfield Church offered to
use the name "Plainfield Community Church An Independent Church Practicing
Christian Science." Id. The Mother Church objected, however, viewing the pro-
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On appeal to the appellate division, the Plainfield Church
maintained that the restrictions placed on it by the chancery division resulted in a name that failed to identify their organization
and theology.'
A divided panel of the appellate division affirmed the chancery division decision in part and reversed in
part.2'4 The appellate division held that, as a matter of law, the
term "Christian Science" was generic and not protectible with
regard to church names. 2'5 Because one appellate judge dissented, the Mother Church appealed to the New Jersey Supreme
Court as of right.2 " The supreme court affirmed the appellate
division's decision, holding the phrases "Christian Science" and
"Christian Science Church" constituted generic terms which
were not entitled to trademark protection. 7 The court concluded that the defendants may utilize either phrase in naming
their church. -8
As early as 1803, the common law recognized a form of unfair competition which became known as "palming off" or "passposed name as a violation of the injunction, and therefore brought a motion in aid
of litigant's rights. 1d. The chancery court ruled that the second line, "An Independent Church Practicing Christian Science," may be permissible only as an
explanatory phrase, separate from the church name. Id. Additionally, the chancery
court placed specific restrictions on the second line's size, type and style of lettering. Id. In particular, the court required that only a specific number of words remain on each line, thereby reducing the impact of the explanatory phrase. Id.
23 See id. It should be noted that the Plainfield Church only challenged, the trial
court's injunction only with respect to the terms "Christian Science" and "Christian Science Church." Id. at 303, 520 A.2d at 1350. Thus, apparently the Plainfield
Church agreed to the restrictions against the use of the phrases "Christ, Scientist"
and "Church of Christ, Scientist." Id.
24 See id. at 303-04, 520 A.2d at 1350-51. The appellate division majority ruled
that the Mother Church was not entitled to the exclusive use of the words "Christian Science," and that the same phrase could be used by the Plainfield Church in
naming their church. See Christian Science Bd. of Directors v. Evans, 199 N.J.
Super. 160, 171, 488 A.2d 1054, 1059 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 105 N.J. 297, 520
A2d 1347 (1987). The majority reasoned that the primary significance of the term
"Christian Science" was the religion's name, and thus, the phrase could not be
appropriated as a tradenanie for a church. Id. at 168, 488 A.2d at 1058. Judge
Gavnor dissented, and asserted that the trial court's injunction should be reversed
with regard to the term "Christian Science." Id. at 172, 488 A.2d at 1060 (Gaynor,
J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Gaynor maintained that adequate and significant evidence existed which supported the trial judge's conclusions that "Christian
Science" was not a generic term. Id. The Plainfield Church did not challenge the
injunction concerning the Reading Room. Christian Science Bd. of Directols, 105 N.J.
at 304, 520 A.2d at 1351.
25 Christian Science Bd. ojDIrec/ors, 105 N.J. at 304, 520 A.2d at 1351.
26 See id. at 300, 520 A.2d at 1349 (citing N.J. CT'. R. 2:2-1 (a)(2)).
27 Id. at 305, 307, 520 A.2d at 1351, 1353.
28 See id.
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ing off."' '
Palming off is a tort which consists of selling one's
"goods as the goods of another." ' The tort of palming off developed from the customarily actionable torts of fraud and deceit.3
Accordingly, nineteenth century decisions involving
palming off focused on the fraudulent intent of the tortfeasor
rather than the public confusion created by the fraud. 2
In the early twentieth century, however, a new analysis
emerged."3 Courts began to concentrate more on the public confusion aspect and the fraudulent intent component became less
important. 4 Presently, palming off is recognized as one type of
conduct prohibited by the law of trademarks and unfair competition."5 A primary consideration under both trademark infringement and unfair competition is to avoid consumer confusion."
In 1947, Congress enacted the Lanham Trademark Act,3 7 incorporating both substantive and procedural rights affecting unfair competition and trademark infringement.3 8 The Lanham Act
codified "the
common law of unfair competition and trademark
protection. ' ':'
Interpreting the Lanham Act, courts have recognized four
classifications of marks for the purposes of trademark registra29 I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.2 at 133. See also Hanover Star Milling Co.
V.Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251, 255

(1877) (both discussing "palming off").
30 See V1cLeap, 96 U.S. at 255.
I' I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.2 at 133.
32 See id. McCarthy explains that "[i]n the 19th century cases, trade-mark infringement embodied much of the elements of fraud and deceit from which trademark protection developed. That is, the element of fraudulent intent was
emphasized over the objective facts of consumer confusion." Id.
33 See id.
34 1d. "By the early 20th century, the fraudulent aspects of passing off were gradually de-emphasized and emphasis was placed on the effect of confusingly similar
marks on buyers, rather than upon the intent of the infringer." Id.
: Id.
:" See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 497 (2d Cir.
1962). Thus, in Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980),
the Court stated: "In this circuit likelihood of confusion is determined by evaluating a variety of factors, including the type of trademark at issue; similarity of design;
similarity of product; identity retail outlets and purchasers; identity of advertising
media utilized: defendant's intent; and actual confusion." Id. at 1185.
37 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982 & Supp 11 1984), as antendedbv Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L.. No. 667, 102 Stat. 3235.
38 See IJ.T. MCCARTIHN, supra note 1, § 5.4 at 141; Derenberg, The Patent Office as
Guardian of the Public inerest i 7rademark RegistratioiiProceedings, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoBLEms 288 (1949).
39) Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2
(1982) (White, J., concurring) (citing S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1946)).
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tion: (1) generic or commonly descriptive; (2) merely descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful4' Although the
categories are well defined, the task of classifying a particular
mark remains difficult. It is not uncommon that a particular mark
can be placed in more than one category depending on the use of
the product it is identifying. 4 ' In addition, the categories overlap, thus making classification even more complicated.4 2
A mark is generic or commonly descriptive if it defines or
identifies the type of goods or services in connection with which
it is used, and such a mark is not entitled to protection.43 A mark
is merely descriptive if it describes a characteristic or quality of a
product.4 4 A merely descriptive term may acquire trademark
40 See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Educational Development Corp. v. Economy Co., 562 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Salton, Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F.
Supp. 975, 985 (D.N.J. 1979).
41 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976). The Abercrombie court stated:
Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to
trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes
are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. The lines of demarcation, however, are not always bright. Moreover, the difficulties are compounded because a term that is in one
category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for
another, because a term may shift from one category to another in light
of differences in usage through time, because a term may have one
meaning to one group of users and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put to different uses with respect to a single
product.
Id. at 9.
42 See id.
43 "A 'generic' term refers to 'a particular genus or class of which an individual
article or service is but a member[;]' it suggests the 'basic nature of articles or services.' " Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Abercrombie & Fitch Co.v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976);
American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. Heritage Life Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 3,
11 (5th Cir. 1974)). See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561
F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977). In .Miller Brewing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the word "light" was a commonly descriptive when used in connection
with beer and that neither that word nor a phonetic equivalent, i.e., "Lite," were
entitled to trademark protection. Id. at 79.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a geographic term is not entitled to trademark trademark protection on the theory that it

was commonly descriptive of the place of manufacture. See Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v.

Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901). The Elgin Court held that one
producer could not monopolize a geographic term when other producers could
utilize the identical word with congruent accuracy and justification. Id. at 673.
44 See Viller Brewinkg Co., 561 F.2d at 79. It is often said that a term is merely
descriptive if it "describes the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of the goods
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protection upon proof of secondary meaning.4" A mark is suggestive if it not describe but suggests the quality or characteristics of an article, and thus, requires the public to use its
imagination to establish the nature of the product.4" A suggestive mark is entitled to protection without proof of secondary
meaning, but it is oftentimes difficult to distinguish from a
merely descriptive mark.4 7 An arbitrary or fanciful term, on the
other hand, is further removed from a merely descriptive mark
. . . [or] conveys information regarding a function, or purpose, or use of the
goods." In reAbcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1989) (footnotes omitted). For example, in In re Bailey Meter Company, 102 F.2d 843, 844
(C.C.P.A. 1939), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals upheld a trademark
examiner's refusal to register the term "Boiler Meter" as a trademark on the theory
that the term was merely descriptive of the name of the device on which it was used.
[he court reasoned that the term "Meter" was the generic name for the applicant's
device and that the applicant, the Bailey Meter Company, merely sought to apply
the term to meters used to measure the course of steam from the boiler; therefore,
the court determined that the product was, in fact, a "Boiler Meter" and not entitled to trademark protection without proof of secondary meaning. Id.
45 See Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 79. Secondary meaning attaches to a product when the primary significance of a term or mark identifies the origin of a good
or service and not merely the good or service itself. See Sahon Inc. v.Cornwall
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 975, 988 (D.N.J. 1979) (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. EverReady, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Bardahl
Oil Co. v. Atomic Oil Co., 351 F.2d 148, 150 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S.
1010 (1966)). More specifically, the Salton court stated "[slecondary meaning
comes about when a phrase or name has been used so long and so exclusively by
one producer that to consumers of the item the word or phrase now means that
producer's product." Id. (citations omitted).
The proponent of a merely descriptive mark bears the burden of proving secondary meaning. Aloe Creme Laboratotes. Inc. v. Alilsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928, reh'g dentied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970). In Aloe Creme, the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the evidentiary requirements regarding
proof of secondary meaning: "A claim of secondary meaning presents a question of
fact. The chief inquiry is the attitude of the consumer toward the mark; does it
denote to him a "single thing coming from a single source"? Short of a survey, this
is difficult of direct proof." Id.
It should be noted that a generic term is not entitled to protection even if it
may have acquired a secondary meaning. See A.J. Catfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d

291 (3d Cir. 1986). In that case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the
significance of secondary meaning with respect to a generic term. See id. at 297.
The Third Circuit observed: "[E]vidence that a generic term is identified with one
producer indicative of a secondary meaning for a descriptive term, proves only
what courts call 'de facto' secondary meaning. Such evidence indicates only that
the producer has dominated the market for a product." Id.
46 See Ailler, 561 F.2d at 79.
47 See id. In Sttx Products Inc. v.

'ntted lerchants & Manufacturers,Inc., 295 F.Supp.

479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court stated the distinction between suggestive and
merely descriptive terms as follows: "A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought or perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods. A
term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods."
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and is less likely to be mistaken for a descriptive term.4 The
arbitrary or fanciful
mark is also protectible without proof of sec4
ondary meaning. 9
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court adopted the primary significance test as the touchstone for genericness in the
landmark case of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. ' In Kellogg, the
Court's analysis focused on consumer understanding of the term,
and held that the originator of an article does not maintain an
exclusive right to the term used to identify its product. 5 ' In Kellogg, the National Biscuit Company and its predecessor had manufactured a cereal product bearing the mark "Shredded Wheat"
since 1893.52 In 1927, the Kellogg Company began distributing
and producing a similar product with the same brand name.:
The National Biscuit Company filed suit in federal district court
against the Kellogg Company alleging unfair competition:5
The district court dismissed the complaint and held that the
term "shredded wheat" had fallen into the public domain upon
the expiration of National Biscuit Company's patent. 5 The court
of appeals initially affirmed the district court's order.5 6 Upon rehearing, however, the court of appeals entered a judgment which
restrained the Kellogg Company from using the words "ShredSee id.
See id.
50 305 U.S. 111 (1938). The primary significance test was first enunciated by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505
(2d Cir. 1921). Chnistian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 320, 520 A.2d at 1359
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting); see S. REP. No. 627, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984). The
Bayer case was a trademark cancellation action in which the court recognized that a
controversy could surface because the public's use of a term. See Bayer, 272 F. at
510. The Bayer court stated: -It]he single question, as I view it, in all these cases, is
merely one of fact: What do the buyers understand by the word whose use the
parties are contending?" Id. at 509 [emphasis added].
5 See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118-19.
52 See id. at 113. Shredded wheat in the form of a pillow shaped biscuit was first
produced by Henry D. Perky of Colorado in 1893. Id. at 113-14. During his lifetime, Mr. Perky maintained contact with the companies that marketed shredded
wheat. Id. at 114. In 1901, the Natural Food Company was formed, and in 1908,
its corporate name was changed to "The Shredded Wheat Company." Id. In 1930,
the same company was acquired by the plaintiff, National Biscuit Company. Id.
53 Id. at 114. From 1912 to 1919, Kellogg Company marketed a similar product
to National Biscuit Company's shredded wheat. Id. The Kellogg Company, however, used a different production method. Id. The National Biscuit Company initially filed suit in 1928, but by consent of the parties the suit was discontinued in
1930. In 1932, the National Biscuit Company instituted a second suit. Id.
54 Id.
55 See id.
48

49

56" Id.
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ded Wheat" and from marketing the product in a pillow shaped
form. " 7 Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.5"
Writing for the majority, Justice Brandeis asserted that the
term "shredded wheat" was a generic term in that it identified a
pillow shaped biscuit." ' On this basis, the Court held that the
Kellogg Company had a legal right to distribute the product
under its commonly used name, notwithstanding that the National Biscuit Company was the first producer."" Moreover, Justice Brandeis explained that to establish a trademark, the
National Biscuit Company must demonstrate that "the primary
significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
[was] not the product but the producer.""' The Court recognized that the only obligation incumbent upon the Kellogg Com57 Id. at 114-15. After rehearing, the court of appeals ordered the district court
to enter an order enjoining the Kellogg Company from using the name "Shredded
Wheat" and from marketing the biscuit in a pillow shape form. See id. The court's
opinion defined the goods bearing the trademark as "consisting of a dish, containing two biscuits submerged in milk." Id. at 115 (citations omitted). Thereafter, the
district court entered an order in the exact language of the appellate court's opinion. Id. Consequently, confusion arose because the parties each interpreted the
district court's ruling differently. Id.
The Kellogg Company argued that the order only restricted them from marketing their product as "shredded wheat," in a pillow form, in conjunction with the
visual effect of two biscuits in a breakfast bowl. Id. They further alleged that the
court did not restrain them from using the pillow shape form or naming its product
"shredded wheat, unless at the same time it use[d] upon its cartons plaintiff's
trademark consisting of a dish with two biscuits in it." Id. On petition for clarification, the court of appeals ruled that the Kellogg Company was restricted from (1)
using the term "Shredded Wheat;" (2) advertising or selling its biscuit in a pillow
shaped form, and (3) doing either (1) or (2). Id.
58 Id. at 115. Previously, the Kellogg Company petitioned the United States
Supreme Court immediately after the court of appeals ruled in favor of the National
Biscuit Company. Id. (citations omitted). The initial petition for certiorari was denied, and the United States Supreme Court also denied the request for a rehearing.
Id. (citations omitted). Nonetheless, after the court of appeals clarified its order,
the Kellogg Company again petitioned the Supreme Court. Id. Thereafter, the
Court reconsidered its denial and granted the Kellogg Company's second petition
for certiorari. Id.
5' Id. at 116.
60 Id. at 116-17.
i1 Id. at 118. The Court further ruled that once an item was manufactured by
competitors, the first producer was prohibited from asserting a primary right in the
shape of the article because the public identified with the shape of the product. See
id. at 120. The Court next addressed whether the Kellogg Company reasonably
distinguished its product from the National Biscuit Company's. See id. The Court
asserted that Kellogg Company's packaging was different, and it was distinguishably labelled. Id. at 120-21. The Court next opined that the Kellogg Company must
reasonably prevent confusion, but that it was not required to inform every consumer. 1d. at 121.
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pany was to distinguish its product from the product
manufactured by the National Biscuit Company. "2
A potentially revolutionary deviation from the primary significance test occurred in 1982 in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General
Mills Fun Group Inc." In Anti-Monopoly the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the registered mark "monopoly," through usage, had become a generic term for a board game."4 Anti-Monopoly, Incorporated, petitioned the court, among other things,
for a declaratory judgment cancelling the "Monopoly"
registration."5
The Ninth Circuit initially recognized that the term was not
generic at the time of registration; nevertheless, it questioned the
mark's protectibility after usage."" Judge Duniway observed that
the General Mills Fun Group had promoted the mark "Monopoly" in connection with its game so successfully that the term
"Monopoly" became commonly descriptive of a board game involving real estate."7 In its analysis the court rejected the primary significance test and instead focused on the buyer's
motivation for purchasing the board game."' Judge Duniway, relying on the motivation test, concluded that the term identified
the product not the source.""' Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit re62

Id. at 119.

63 684 F.2d

1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub norn. CPG Products Corp. v.

Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). See also S. REP. No. 627, 98th Cong. 2d
Sess. 5-6 (1984).
64

A4nti-Alonopol, 684 F.2d at 1323.

65

Id. at 1318.

66 Id. at 1321. The ,ntiA-lonopo/y

court stated:

[W]e have concluded that the evidence, construed most favorably to
Anti-Monopoly, does not show that "Monopoly" had become generic
before Parker Brother registered it as its trademark ....We agree with
the trial judge's conclusion that "Monopoly" had not become generic
before Parker Brothers registered it as a trademark.
Id.
67

Id. at 1323. More specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated:
To us, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that [the General Mills Fun
Group Inc. 1 very successfully promoted the game of Monopoly, but that
in doing it they so successfully promoted "Monopoly" as "the name of
that game," that it became generic in the sense in which we use the term
in trademark law.

Id.
(8 See id. at 1324. See also S. REP. No. 627, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 5-6 (1984). The

Anti-.MIonopoly court focused on surveys conducted under the instruction of AntiMonopoly. Anti-.Ionopolv, 684 F.2d at 1324. The surveys inquired as to whether
the consumer purchased "Monopoly" because they wanted a Parker Brothers'
game, or because they wanted a real estate board game regardless of the producer.
Id.
(;9) Id. at 1326.

[he Anti-onopoly court stated:
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manded the case, and instructed the district court to enter ajudg7
ment in favor of Anti-Monopoly. 0
Commentators and practitioners harshly criticized the analysis set forth in Anti-Monopoly. 7 ' Congress, provoked by the confusion stemming from the Ninth Circuit opinion, enacted the
Trademark Clarification Act of 1984.72 This act recognized the
validity of the "dual-function" mark, which it defined as a trademark that identified a particular product and source, even if the
source was unknown to the consumer.7 3 Congress restored the
primary significance test, and explicitly rejected the motivation
test used by the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly.7 4
Various state and federal courts have addressed the prevalent issue of whether the name of a religion is entitled to trademark protection when used in connection with a church name.7 5
In McDaniel v. Mirza Ahmad Sorab, 7 15plaintiffs McDaniel and fellow
church members, brought suit to prohibit Mirza Ahmad Sorab's
use of the religious name "Baha'i. ' 7 7 The defendants, Mirza
Ahmad Sorab and another, were members of the Baha'i religion
and in the past were affiliated with McDaniel's church, the National Spiritual Assembly. 7 ' The defendants separated from the
National Spiritual Assembly, but continued to use the term
"Baha'i" to identify their religious organization and activities.7 '
McDaniel asserted that the defendant's use of the term "Baha'i"
confused the public."' The New York State Supreme Court held,
however, that the plaintiff's could not monopolize the religion's
We conclude that the findings regarding the survey are clearly erroneous, and that it does support the conclusion that the primary significance of "Monopoly" is [the] product rather than [the] source .... We
hold that, as applied to a board game, the word "Monopoly" has become "generic," and the registration of it as a trademark is no longer
valid.
Id.
70

Id.

71 See S. REP. No. 627, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-6 (1984).

The Senate Report
stated that the Anti-1lonopolv decision "has been unanimously criticized by every
commentator discussing it." Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
72 See id.
at 8.
7" See id. 5, 8-9.
74 Id. at 5, 9.
75 See supra note 3 and cases cited therein.
76 27 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1941), afftd, 29 N.Y.S.2d 509, 262 A.D. 838
(N.Y.App.Div. 1941).
77 See id. at 526.
78 See id.
79 See id.at 526-27.
80 See id. at 526.
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name. 8
Moreover, the court recognized that Mirza Ahmad
Sohra's actions were not. intended to deceive. 2
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Purcell v. Summers,8
enjoined a disaffiliated church organization from using the same
name as that of the parent church. 4 Purcell and others sought to
enjoin Summers and other dissident church members from incorporating under the name "Methodist Episcopal Church,
South." 5 The trial court held that the terms "Methodist" and
"Episcopal" were generic and therefore there was nothing to
prevent the disaffiliated organization from using those terms in
naming their church."' The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, ruled that the defendants did not have the right to use
the identical name it had before its disaffiliation. 7 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that although the terms were generic, the use of
the same name was likely to cause confusion and in effect deceive
the public."
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court
decision. " '
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, in Jandron v. Zuendel,90 enjoined the defendants, "Third
Church of Christ, Scientist," from using the terms "Church of
Christ, Scientist," "Christian Science Church," "or any confusing
or misleading" name. "' The court reasoned that the injunction
would not inhibit the defendant's right to practice the Christian
Science religion.92 The district court observed that the injunction would merely prohibit the defendant from profiting from the
Mother Church's good will and identity. "
81 Id. at 527.

85

Id.
145 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1944).
See id. at 991.
Id. at 981.

86

See id. at 988.

82
83
84

See id.
See id.
89' Id. at 991.
9() 139 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
87
88

91 See id. at 888-90.
92

Id. at 889.

93 Id. Specifically, the court stated:
The effect of an injunction would be to prevent defendants from appro-

priating to themselves the good will and identity which, in the public
mind, attach to the term "Church of Christ, Scientist", or "Christian
Science Church." That is not to say that defendants are not worthy of
the respect engendered by that term, but only that they should not be
permitted to profit through use of the term.

988
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Oklahoma District Council
of the Assemblies of God of the State of Oklahoma, Inc. v. New Hope Assembly of God Church of Norman, Oklahoma, Inc.'1 4 held that the principles of unfair competition were applicable to both charitable
and religious organizations.!"5 In that case, a controversy arose
between the two organizations, and the Assemblies of God,
Oklahoma District Council withdrew its recognition of New Hope
Assembly of God. 96 The court asserted that once a term acquires
a secondary meaning it then becomes protectible"' The court
reasoned that the exclusive right was based upon the likelihood
of confusion. ' Moreover, the court explained that secondary
meaning was acquired if "over a period of time, the word or
name has come to stand in the minds of the public as a name or
identification for that product or firm."''" The court reversed the
order of summary judgment, and held that neither party was entitled to summary judgment based upon the record.' 0
Against this background, the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that the law of trademark and unfair competition would not
permit a parent church to prevent a disaffiliated, former branch
from using the name of a religion within its new church name."I
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Clifford, the court initially emphasized the awkwardness of applying trademark principles to a religious setting. 1' 2 The court asserted, however, that
religious institutions were equally entitled to trademark
protection."'
The court noted that the religion practiced by both the
Mother Church and the Plainfield Church, Christian Science, had
existed for thirteen to twenty-three years before the Mother
Church was organized, and that the religion and the Mother
94 597 P.2d 1211 (1979).
95 Id. at 1213.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1214.

" See id. (citing Little Tavern Shops v. Davis, 116 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1941)).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1215.

101 See Christian Science Bd. of Directors v. Evans, 105 N.J. 297, 307, 520 A.2d
1347, 1353 (1987).
102 Id. at 304, 520 A.2d at 1351.
103 Id. (citing National Bd. of Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 335 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D.S.C. 1971); Assembly of The
Baha'is Under the Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. National Spiritual Assembly of
The Baha'is, 150 U.S.P.Q(BNA) 346, 354-55 (N.D.11I 1966); Annotation, Right of
Charitableor Religious Ass 'nor Coiporation to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar
Name by Another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277 (197 1)).
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Church were theoretically separate.1 4 As such, the court reasoned that any person not practicing the religion of "Christian
Science" could not use that phrase in naming their church, and,
conversely, any individual practicing the religion was entitled to
use the term.'" 5 On the other hand, the court deduced that because the Plainfield Church practiced the religion of "Christian
Science," it should be permitted to use the words Christian Science in the name of its new organization. 0 0
Asserting that the common name of a religion was generic,
the court declared it was irrelevant that the Mother Church exclusively used the term "Christian Science Church" now and had
done so for a long period of time.'" 7 The court asserted it was
natural development that the public referred to the Mother
Church with the phrase "Christian Science Church" and that,
notwithstanding the existence of a more formal name, it was
equally probable new churches practicing Christian Science
would be designated by the public as the "Christian Science
Church.'. 8 Accordingly, the court concluded it was a fundamental matter of trademark law that, as a generic term, the name
of the religion "Christian Science" could not be appropriated for
exclusive use. ')
The majority rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
phrase "Christian Science Church" was merely descriptive term
and entitled to trademark protection upon proof of secondary
meaning.'"' The court explained that a secondary meaning
would be established only with evidence that the descriptive term
as perceived by the public referred to a single source.''' The
court also emphasized that because the term "Christian Science
104 Id.
105 1d.

106 Id. The court posited that if the Plainfield Church had been disaffiliated from
the Mother Church in the late nineteenth century, then even Mary Baker Eddy
could not have prohibited the Plainfield Church from using the name "Christian
Science," provided that the name was used in an accurate and truthful manner. Id.
107 Id. at 306, 502 A.2d at 1352. The court stated that the Mother Church could
not appropriate the common name of a religion, because the phrase was public
domain. Id.
Io Id.
1tO9 Id. In support of its reasoning, the court cited In re Bailey Meter Co., 102
F.2d 843 (C.C.P.A. 1939). See Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 307, 520
A.2d at 1352; see also supra note 44 (discussing Bailey Meter). The majority stated
that as in Bailey Meter, no term would serve to identify the religion except the name
of the religion itself. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. at 307, 520 A.2d at
1352.
' '0
Id. at 310, 520 A.2d at 1354.
' ' ' Id. at 309, 520 A.2d at 1353-54 (citing Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Mil-
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Church" was generic, secondary meaning was immaterial.' 12
Additionally, the court rejected the contention of the Mother
Church that the phrase "Christian Science" was a "dual-function" mark, entitled to protection under the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984.'1
The court recognized that the 1984
amendments addressed the issue of dual function marks which
are trademarks that identify both the product and its source. 114
The court asserted, however, that the 1984 amendments applied
only to registered trademarks and thus did not control this
case.

11

After reiterating its discomfort in applying trademark principles to the religious setting, the court observed that historically,
san, 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, rRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 11.9 at 454 (2 ed. 1984)).
112 Id. at 309-10, 520 A.2d at 1354. In particular, Justice Clifford stated:
A showing of "secondary meaning," no matter how strong, can never
earn trademark status for a generic word or phrase. It is the fact that
has led to the coining of the phrase "de facto secondary meaning."
What is meant is that when a producer selects as a trademark a term that
is deemed already to have been the commonly-recognized (generic)
name of the goods, then even if the producer successfully establishes
"de facto" secondary meaning, it will not be recognized dejure.
Id. (citing, A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986);
Greenbaum, Ginsburg, & Weinberg, A Proposal for Evaluating Genericism After "'AntiMonopoly," 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 122-23 (1983)).
I 13 Id. The court explained that the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335, was enacted in response to confusion created by the
An/i-Monopoly decision, in which the Ninth Circuit had used the motivation test in
arrogation of the primary significance test as the touchstone of genericness. See id.;
see also supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing An/i-Mlonopoly and legislative response to that decision). The majority in Christian Science Board of Directors
recognized that pursuant to the 1984 legislation, a registered mark would not be
classified as a generic term simply because it was also used to designate a unique
good or service. Christian Science Board of Directors, 105 N.J. at 311, 520 A. 2d at
1354.
114 Id.
I .' Id. Justice Clifford explained:

We appreciate full well that a name of a product can of course be a
source-identifier. It is especially important to recognize that fact in
cases in which a manufacturer of a unique product first encounters competition, possibly by patent expiration, as happened in An/i-1 onopoly.
However, those concerns have no bearing on the case before us. Plaintiffs are not facing cancellation of a registered mark. Nor are they sole
suppliers of a "unique product," facing competition for the first time
due to expiration of a patent or some comparable circumstance. Our
denial of plaintiffs' request for trademark protection and injunctive relief does not stem from any lack of appreciation of the significance of
"dual-function" marks. The Lanham Act amendments simply do not
bear on the problem posed in this case.
Id. at 312, 520 A.2d at 1355 (citation omitted).
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communities have contained diverse religions and various denominations stemming from those religions.'6 The majority
recognized, however, that many of the religious denominations
share a common element in their church's name as a result of
past association with a parent organization.' 17
The majority next reviewed several cases which supported
their decision to deny relief to the Mother Church.'" It conceded that an injunction may be appropriate where a branch
church adopts the identical name of the Mother Church.' "'. The
majority explained, however, that the defendants in this case did
not seek to use an identical or almost identical name.' 2°' Accord21
ingly, the court held that an injunction would not be proper.
Moreover, the majority explicitly rejected the ruling and reason2
ing ofJandron v. Zuendel. '
Finally, the majority concluded that it was unnecessary to address the constitutional ramifications raised by the Plainfield
Church since the injunction granted by the lower court was dissolved. 2 ' The court stated in dicta, however, that there would
be no free speech violation even if the injunction had been upheld. '2 4 Moreover, the majority expressed its grave reservation
of "whether an injunction would violate defendants' rights to exercise their religion freely or would violate federal or state consti116 Id.
117 Id. Specifically, the Justice observed that "[nlearly all our varieties of
churches of the same denomination are the result of secession or withdrawals from
the parent church of that name, and it has been the usual course for the new church
to adopt as a permanent part of its name the name of the parent organization." Id.
(quoting Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Improved Order Knights of Pythias,
113 Mich. 133, 136, 71 N.W. 470, 471 (1897)).
'11 Id. at 312-13, 520 A.2d at 1355.
1''9 Id. at 313, 520 A.2d at 1356.
120 Id. at 315, 520 A.2d at 1356.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 315-16, 520 A.2d at 1357. More specifically, the court stated:
rhe trial court here relied extensively onjandron v. Zueidel. Plaintiff, directors and trustees of The First Church of Christ, Scientist (The

Mother Church), sought to enjoin defendants . . . from using the [same]
name . . . or any construction or name so similar to "Church of Christ,

Scientist" or "Christian Science Church" as to be likely to deceive or
confuse the public. [he court granted the injunction . . . [and] found
the decision in Purcell v. Summers dispositive.... We agree with the Appellate Division that Pmrcell v. Summers does not support the result
reached inJadron v. Zuendel.
Id. (citations omitted). See also supra notes 83-89 (discussing Purcell v. Summers),
notes 90-93 (discussing Jandron v. Zueudel).
123 Id. at 316, 520 A.2d at 1357.
124 Id.
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' 25
tutional prohibitions against the establishment of religion."'
In a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Garibaldi, in
which Justice O'Hernjoined, the two Justices challenged the conclusion of both the majority and the appellate division that the
term "Christian Science Church" was generic.' 12 After discussing the concept of genericness, the dissent questioned the majority's failure to recognize that a term may be generic when used in
connection with one good or service and descriptive, suggestive
or even arbitrary when used in connection with another. 12 7 As
such, the dissent stated that "[t]he majority's conclusion that
'Christian Science' is generic when used to refer to the religion
founded by Mary Baker Eddy, does not answer the question
whether 'Christian Science'
is generic or descriptive when used
28
to name a church."'
The dissent further noted that the classification of a mark
presents a question of fact. 12 11 In this regard, the Justices maintained there was sufficient, credible evidence in the record to
support the trial judge's finding that the term "Christian Science
Church" was descriptive of churches affiliated with the Mother
Church.'"" Accordingly, the Justices claimed the majority im-

1, para. 4).
Justice Garibaldi noted that the Mother Church had conceded that the term
"Christian Science" was generic provided that the term was used to identify a religion. Id. at 317, 520 A.2d at 1358 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). The dissent asserted,
however, that not everyone should be allowed to use the phrase "Christian Science
Church" in naming their church. Id.
127 Id. at 318-19, 520 A.2d at 1358-59 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent
commented that the standards for determining genericness tended to be too
mechanical because they failed to consider the surrounding facts and circumstances
of each case. Id. at 319, 520 A.2d at 1359 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
128 Id. Justice Garibaldi was particularly critical of the majority's reliance on In re
125 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.J. CONST. art.

12fi

Baile' .Meter Co., 102 F.2d 843 (C.C.P.A. 1939). Christian Science Boardof Directors, 105

N.J. at 319, 520 A.2d at 1359 (Garibaldi, J, dissenting); see also supra note 44 (discussing Bailey A:le/er). The Justice opined that the Bailey court could have easily decided that the term boiler meter was descriptive, rather than generic. Christian
Science Board of Directors, 105 NJ. at 319, 520 A.2d at 1359 (Garibaldi,J, dissenting).
Moreover, recognizing that a term may be either generic, descriptive, arbitrary or
suggestive depending on the product it is identifying, Justice Garibaldi posited that
the majority's conclusion that the term "Christian Science" was generic when applied to the name of a religion was not dispositive of the fact that the same term
may be generic when included in a church name. Id. at 320-21, 520 A.2d at 135960 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
121) Christian Science Board of Directors, 105 N.J. at 321, 520 A.2d at 1360 (Garibaldi,
J, dissenting) (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 322-24, 520 A.2d at 1360-61 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495, 500 (1974)
(holding that trial judge's findings of fact in non-jury case are binding on appeal
unless "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
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properly disregarded that finding.''
Similarly, the dissenting Justices articulated that there was
sufficient, credible evidence to support the trial judge's finding
that the Plainfield Church's proposed use of the term "Christian
Science Church" would cause a substantial likelihood of confusion to the public.' 3 2 The dissenters reasoned that the Plainfield
Church's addition of the words "Independent" and "of Plainfield, NewJersey" to the term "Christian Science Church" would
be insufficient to distinguish their church from churches affiliated
with the Mother Church. 3 " The dissenting Justices would, however, permit the Plainfield Church to identify itself as "Plainfield
Community Church-An Independent Church Practicing Christian Science." 13 4 In reaching this conclusion, they expressed that
the latter phrase did not include the term "Christian Science
Church" in its primary name and merely referred to the religion
of Christian Science the remainder of its title.'3 5 As such, the
dissenting Justices took the position that the latter term was not
similar enough to the Mother Church's name to mislead the
public. ',
Finally, the dissent questioned the majority's reliance on sevand reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests ofjustice")). Bearing in
mind the Rova Farms standard of review, the dissent found sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge's findings and concluded that the
appellate division and the majority should not have rejected those findings without
any explanation. Christian Science Board of Directors, 105 N.J. at 324, 520 A.2d at
1361-62 (Garibaldi, J, dissenting).
I:31 Id. The dissent also criticized the appellate division and the majority for failing to recognize that the term "Christian Science Church" may be a valid dualfunction mark. Id. at 323-24, 520 A.2d at 1361-62 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The
dissent observed that a primary significance inquiry was necessary to evaluate the
term Christian Science Church. Id. The Justice explained that based upon principles involving dual-function marks, the term "Christian Science Church" may be
protectible depending on consumer understanding of the phrase. Id. (citing S.
Rep. No. 627, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, repnted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1516, 1526).
132 Id. at 325-26, 520 A.2d at 1362 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
emphasized that the Mother Church was required only to prove a likelihood of confusion and not actual confusion. Id. at 325, 520 A.2d at 1362 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). Accordingly, the dissent concluded that there was adequate evidence to
support the trial court's finding that the use of the phrase by the Plainfield Church
caused public confusion. Id. at 325-26, 520 A.2d at 1362 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting)
(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484, 323 A.2d
495. 500 (1974)).
'33 Id. at 325, 520 A.2d at 1362 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
134

Id.

135

Id. at 326, 520 A.2d at 1362 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id.

1i
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eral decisions from foreign jurisdictions. 3 7 The dissent next
concluded that the injunction would not have violated the deJustice Garibaldi's opinion
fendant's first amendment rights.'
emphasized that the Plainfield Church was free to practice the
religion and use the term "Christian Science" provided that the
disaffiliated Church did not infringe upon the rights of the
Mother Church.""' The Justice observed that "[t]rademark infringement [was] not protected by the Constitution." 140 Accordthe appellate division and
ingly, the dissent would have reversed
4'
order.'
court's
trial
the
restored
In at least one state, courts have lessened the strictness of
trademark principles when applying them to charitable or religious settings.' 4 2 Apparently, these courts based their reasoning
upon the assertion that philanthropic endeavors are important to
the community.' 4 3 The survival of philanthropic activities is ensured by the judiciary's leniency towards the existence of new organizations adopting a name similar to an already existing
Accordingly, by liberally construing unfair comorganization.'
petition and trademark principles, the courts grant only limited
protection to the original charitable organization under the presumption of furthering a potential societal benefit.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, did not adopt
such an approach. The court impartially applied the principles of
unfair competition. Seemingly, leniency was not bestowed.upon
religious and charitable institutions. Both the majority and dissent agreed that an appropriation of an identical or almost identical name would result in an injunction against the unauthorized
user. 145

The majority differed from the dissent in its recognition and
emphasis that the religion emerged before the organization of
the Mother Church.' 4" Thus, the majority held that the name of
the religion was generic, and secondary meaning was irrelevant.' 47 The dissent asserted that although the term Christian
137
138

Id. at 327, 520 A.2d at 1363 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 329, 520 A.2d at 1364 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).

139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142

See Annotation, supra note 3,at 284.

143 Id.
144

See id.

145 Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 105 N.J. 313, 520 A.2d at 1356.
146

Id. at 305, 520 A.2d at 1351.

147 Id. at 306, 309-10, 520 A.2d at 1352, 1354.
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Science may be generic when describing a religion, such a conclusion is not dispositive of the fact the term is generic when used
within the name of a church.' 48 The dissent's reasoning should
be discredited by the practical application of such a conclusion.
Currently, the term "Christian Science Church" merely identifies
a religion practiced by a particular community. 4 "' Consequently,
in accordance with tradition, the name of a religion is ordinarily
encompassed within the church name.""
The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion that the
term Christian Science was not a dual function mark.' 5 ' The majority correctly noted that the Trademark Clarification Act only
applied to registered marks that had become generic because of
usage, and in this case the term "Christian Science" or "Christian Science Church" were never registered. At least one other
court has noted, however, that although the Act altered the law
concerning registered marks, the same principles may be applicable to unregistered marks, provided there is no reason for a
distinction. 152
The importance of the classification of a mark is demonstrated by the divided opinions of the Christian Science Board of Directors court. Unfortunately, in light of inconsistent rulings in
different jurisdictions, the determination as to whether a term is
generic or descriptive may depend on the forum deciding the
case. Certainly, inconsistency discourages settlement and compromise, because it increases the opportunity of success. The
categorization of a mark may be dispositive of whether the term
is protectible.
The Christian Science Board of Directors majority formulates a
sound policy which contributes to the permanence and longevity
of new denominations of religious organizations. Religion is a
refuge for many individuals. Some find comfort, contentment,
and spiritual growth in the scriptures and practices of their theology. A vital part of any religion is the atmosphere of community
which strengthens the continued existence of the religion. Each
church realistically relies on maintaining and increasing membership contributions in order to finance church activities. Likewise,
at 317, 520 A.2d at 1358 (Garibaidi, J., dissenting).
Christian Science Bd. of Directors v. Evans, 191 N.J. Super. 411,425, 467
A.2d 268, 275 (Ch. Div. 1983).
148 Id.
149 See

150 See generally Reynolds, Appellate Review of Lanham Act 'iolations: Likelihood of Confusion A question of Law Or Fat? 38 Sw. LJ. 743 (1984).
151 See id. at 232, 523 A.2d at 1361 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
152

See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 299 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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the writings of Mary Baker Eddy offer the same spiritual growth,
faith, and consolation to the Plainfield members as they do to the
Mother Church.
Inherent in securing survival, each church is justified in seeking to increase and maintain membership contributions. In so
doing, the church name is essential as it identifies the religion
practiced by a particular community. Accordingly, the supreme
court properly refused to restrain the Plainfield Church from using the terms "Christian Science" in their church name. Certainly, a contrary ruling may have jeopardized the survival of the
Plainfield Church. The names of the Mother Church and the
Plainfield Church are significantly different. Moreover, individuals familiar with the Mother Church should be aware of the procedure for designating branch churches, which is set forth in the
Church Manual.' 5 13 The majority's foresight of future litigation
may have persuaded the court to decide the case on purely state
common law grounds, thus eliminating the opportunity for an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The majority's ruling that a church practicing Christian Science may use this phrase
in church name, ensures that a new religious community may
adopt a name that particularly identifies its theology, thus increasing the likelihood of the new organization's survival.
Loryn P. Riggiola
153 Id. at 318, 520 A.2d at 1357. It should be noted that subsequent litigation has
taken place between the parties with regard to the form of the Order issued by the
trial court at the direction of the New Jersey Supreme Court. The trial court refused to incorporate language the plaintiff's thought was necessary to ensure that
no consumer confusion would take place. The Mother Church appealed and the
New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed. In an unreported per curiam opinion
dated April 26, 1988, the court stated that the issues raised by the plaintiff to support their arguments were "purely hypothetical and does not present a justiciable
issue." Accordingly, the appellate division affirmed the lower court's decision.

